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Abstract
The EC harmonized market entry regulation for pharmaceuticals from the early sixties
on, but it achieved neither its goal of uniform national regulatory decisions nor that of
automatic mutual recognition. Subsequent attempts to Europeanize the procedures
themselves resulted in two alternatives in 1995: a Centralized Procedure for innovative
pharmaceutical products implemented at the EU level, and a Decentralized Procedure
which tries to assure mutual recognition. First, the paper analyzes the distinctive modes
of Europeanization employed in these regulatory alternatives, examining both their im-
pact on the effectiveness of European governing and the balance they strike between
European interventionism, national participation and national autonomy. Second, it tries
to assess whether Europeanization furthers the goals of pharmaceutical market entry
policy as defined in European regulations – public health protection, creation of a single
market and the reduction of regulatory costs to industry. There is little evidence that the
public’s health is less well protected when regulation is Europeanized. Only the Central-
ized Procedure contributes significantly to the goal of establishing a single market.
Regulatory costs in terms of approval time did go down especially for pharmaceutical
firms using the Centralized Procedure, mainly because of efficiency-enhancing legal pro-
visions and institutionally induced regulatory competition between national authorities.
Zusammenfassung
Seit Anfang der sechziger Jahre hat die EG das Zulassungsrecht für Arzneimittel harmo-
nisiert, ohne damit das Ziel uniformer nationaler Zulassungsentscheidungen bzw. die
gegenseitige Anerkennung derselben zu erreichen. In einer zweiten Stufe kam es zu Ver-
suchen, die Verfahren selbst zu europäisieren, was 1995 in die Einführung von zwei euro-
päischen Zulassungsverfahren mündete – eines zentralisierten mit europäischer Imple-
mentationsstruktur für innovative Medikamente und eines dezentralen, das die gegen-
seitige Anerkennung nationaler Entscheidungen prozedural durchsetzen soll. In diesem
Papier werden zunächst die in diesen Verfahren verwirklichten Formvarianten regu-
lativer Europäisierung und das je charakteristische Verhältnis zwischen europäischer
Intervention, nationaler Partizipation und nationaler Autonomie analysiert sowie nach
der Effektivität europäischen Regierens gefragt. In einem weiteren Schritt wird abzu-
schätzen versucht, wie sich diese Europäisierungsstrategien auf die in der europäischen
Regulierung verankerten Ziele des öffentlichen Gesundheitsschutzes, der Binnenmarkt-
etablierung und der Industrieförderung auswirken. Es spricht wenig dafür, dass die Eu-
ropäisierung des Zulassungsverfahrens den Gesundheitsschutz systematisch vernach-
lässigt. Zur Verwirklichung des Binnenmarkts bei Arzneimitteln trägt bislang eindeutig
nur das zentralisierte Verfahren bei. Schließlich: Insbesondere durch rechtliche Vorgaben
und einen institutionell induzierten regulativen Wettbewerb zwischen nationalen Be-
hörden wurden die regulativen Kosten – gemessen in Zulassungszeiten – speziell für die
Unternehmen reduziert, die das zentralisierte Verfahren nutzen können.
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1 Introduction
This paper1 is about product regulation in an intensely regulated policy field in
which the regulatory landscape in the European Community (EC) has reached a
high degree of institutional variation and sophistication. It is about marketing
authorizations for pharmaceutical products for human use, and will focus on two
major blocks of questions. The first one has to do with the tension between regu-
latory supranationalization – be it central or hierarchical – and national autonomy
(Scharpf 1994), the second one with the efficacy and efficiency of regulatory Eu-
ropeanization. Both questions are connected to the wider topic of governing in
the EC (Scharpf 1999) – here by means of regulatory policies – with the aim of
correcting market behavior while simultaneously enabling the creation of a larger
market and also furthering the policy goals of industrial innovation and competi-
tiveness. The paper focuses mainly on implementation. Policy-making in the
European multi-level system has received most of the attention in the last dec-
ades. But when inquiring into the governing capacity of the EC, the complicated
relationships between European and national institutions, and the impact of
regulatory decision-making, it is no less important to analyze what happens after
regulatory law has been passed. Or, as Martin Shapiro puts it: “the crucial prob-
lem for the Union is now … implementing the regulatory statutes it has enacted”
(Shapiro 2001: 95).
The policy problem of market entry regulation for pharmaceuticals has been on
the agenda of the EC, the Member States and other industrialized countries since
the early sixties, after the thalidomide catastrophe had surfaced with thousands
of fetal deformities and children born with phocomelia. The United States reacted
first, amending already existing, comparably strict market entry regulation. Dur-
ing these years intensive international regulatory discussions took place among
many national governments, parliaments and regulatory authorities as to the ap-
propriate policy solutions. A specific motive behind the EC’s early involvement
in these exchanges on regulatory design was to remove already existing regula-
tory trade barriers and to avoid new ones. After thirty years of trials and relative
successes in harmonizing national legislation – the first legislative guideline
                                                  
1 I would like to thank S. Schmidt and P. Bouwen for their reviews of preceding ver-
sions and very helpful suggestions, F. Scharpf for early discussions about the per-
spective of this paper, P. Urfalino and B. Hauray for their comments on French
regulatory behavior, and G. Abels for useful questions and remarks especially con-
cerning the biotech sector. I would especially like to thank many interviewees in
public institutions at different levels, in industrial and professional associations and
in operational organizations of the health care sector for helping me to understand
the issues discussed in the paper. F. Pfeffer was also extremely helpful in preparing
the graphs and tables.
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coming out as early as 1965 – and of failures in attempting to achieve mutual rec-
ognition through legal harmonization and soft policies of communication re-
quirements and procedural coordination (1975, 1983, 1987), the EC finally intro-
duced two ostensibly European procedures for marketing authorization in 1995,
backed by new regulatory implementation structures. These two European pro-
cedures – a purely national alternative having been retained – obey different in-
stitutional logics, reflecting in their design and allowing in their application the
intrusion of specific national and industrial preferences and interests. It is the still
rather brief experience with these new procedures which provides the empirical
basis of this paper.
Empirical information stems from a variety of sources. Primary information in-
cludes official documents such as legal provisions, administrative guidelines and
the written positions of crucial actors, oral information provided by participating
actors in different agencies and administrations, stakeholders and interested par-
ties, and also process-produced data such as statistics on the procedures and their
outcomes. Secondary information contains statistical data provided by third par-
ties, quantitative and qualitative survey data as well as secondary literature. It
should be noted that in this regulatory area the European tradition is one of ex-
treme secrecy and, furthermore, shows a lack of consistent data collection. This
means that often even seemingly hard data have to be interpreted with great care.
In the literature certain data are often cited – such as national counts of author-
ized or marketed pharmaceuticals – which lack comparability due to differing,
changing or obscured definitions. Where it seems advisable the reader will find
notes of caution.
In the spectrum of EU research2 this paper’s general interest is on the capacity of
the EU to cope with perceived policy problems, to institutionalize a viable regu-
latory implementation structure and to reconcile potential tensions between
European centralization and the autonomy of national authorities. From a policy-
process perspective we are dealing with the output of policy-making, the
throughput system of implementation, and the outcome-related effectiveness of
implementation.3 Analytically the institutionalized regulatory procedures are the
primary focus, because it is the institutional context which prescribes the way de-
cisions have to be taken and provides options as well as restrictions for involved
actors to bring both their cognitive and their normative orientations to bear.4
Furthermore, the different institutional procedures develop their own logic,
making the functionality of the decision-making procedures and any possible
outcomes more or less probable. Although market entry regulation for pharma-
                                                  
2 For overviews see Wolf (1999), Giering (1997) and Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch (1996).
3 See Scharpf (2001a, 1970, 1999).
4 See Mayntz/Scharpf (1995: 43).
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ceuticals is only a rather limited field and probably not even approximately rep-
resentative of EU policy-making and implementation in general, it is nevertheless
an interesting case for different reasons:
– its regulatory history has traversed practically all approaches to European in-
tegration;
– its current regulatory state offers two radically different European regimes, to-
gether with a purely national option, for basically the same regulatory task;
– it is one of the rare governmental intervention fields in which a genuine Euro-
pean implementation structure has been institutionalized for the most Europe-
anized procedural alternative.
J. Weiler’s remark on the EU’s “stunningly small bureaucracy … and … laugha-
bly small budget” (Weiler 2000: 235) reminds us of its resource scarcity, which is
one of the reasons why the EU has been confined mainly to regulatory instead of
distributive policies (Majone 1996a) – except in agricultural and, to a lesser de-
gree, structural policies – and has to rely on Member State administrations for
implementation in a “two-tiered system” leaving the Commission with the prob-
lem of “regulating the regulators” (McGowan/Wallace 1996). The European
Commission generally does not possess the necessary administrative infrastruc-
ture (Scharpf 1994: 91) and Member States have been reluctant to furnish the
Commission with it. Pharmaceuticals regulation for market entry is one of the
rare policy sectors where, finally and selectively, the EU has not only introduced
a positive regulatory policy regime but also a genuine European implementation
structure for parts of the market. Such a regulatory policy-making output was
unexpected, because the Treaty of the European Communities (TEC) explicitly
preserves national intervention autonomy in public health matters (Art. 30 – for-
merly 36 – TEC). Almost ironically, it is this explicit preservation of national in-
tervention rights in the health sector which required rather strong steps being
taken towards Europeanization if other goals were to be achieved, namely the
establishment of a Single Market and the provision of a competitive and innova-
tive regulatory environment for industrial development. Because of this initial
national autonomy in health matters and the complexity of assessing the medical
risks and benefits of pharmaceuticals, the so-called “new approach” to harmoni-
zation could not be applied to medicinal products (Kommission der Europä-
ischen Gemeinschaften 1985). Based on the European Court of Justice’s Cassis de
Dijon decision, this “new approach” of 1985 regarded a minimal degree of legal
harmonization as sufficient to oblige Member States to mutually recognize one
another’s regulatory controls whenever these could be regarded as equivalent
measures of protection. Initially, the European Commission had tried to apply
this strategy to the marketing authorization for pharmaceuticals, too, but very
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quickly it became clear that in this regulatory sector “the old approach” of “total
sectoral harmonization” (Dinan 1999: 356–358) was advised if mutual recognition
should have a chance at all in face of the mutual distrust of national authorities in
each other’s implementation. Eventually, it was the failure to translate even this
extensive legal harmonization into the practice of mutual recognition which fi-
nally brought about what Abraham and Lewis call a “strong European regulatory
state” (Abraham/Lewis 2000: 113) in this domain: the introduction of a central-
ized European procedure for at least parts of the market in order to facilitate the
uniform application of European legislation. Such a policy output becomes possi-
ble or advisable – even in the institutionally difficult setting of multi-level policy-
making – whenever there is consensus about the general policy goals. In this case,
this meant the guarantee of specific market-correcting product standards, the
creation of a larger, more easily accessible transnational market (Scharpf 1999:
106–107, 110), and the improvement of the international standing of the EC-based
pharmaceutical industry.5
The regulation of market entry in the pharmaceuticals sector with its peculiar
procedural differentiation is the result of decades of negotiated policy-making.
The policy output in the form of three different institutionalized procedures in-
corporates problem or product-specific exigencies and takes into account actor-
related orientations, interests and resources. At the same time the procedures
provide the gates and channels through which actors may pursue their specific
interests in the implementation process. Thus, it depends in large measure on the
characteristics of these distinguishable institutional structures and procedures
whether they are likely to contribute to the Europeanization of regulatory deci-
sion-making or are protective of national regulatory autonomy, whether they
tend to support the development of market uniformity or market diversity, and
whether or not they make a difference as regulatory environments for firms with
respect to regulatory efficiency.
                                                  
5 Majone makes the point that in certain situations centralization of regulatory deci-
sion-making can be a viable means to counter distrustful national implementing
authorities by forcing them into an integrated, uniform procedure: “Until regulators
can trust each other to avoid … selfish strategies, centralisation of regulatory author-
ity is the only practical way of correcting transboundary externalities, or preventing
the local regulation of a local market failure from becoming a trade barrier” (Majone
1998: 32). In the case of pharmaceuticals one may, indeed, argue that centralized im-
plementation does succeed in integrating otherwise non-cooperative national author-
ities into a collective decision making process as long as there are no veto positions or
exit opportunities (Majone 1996b: 279–280). But one should also note that even cen-
tralized transnational regulation requires a minimum of mutual understanding and
trustworthy cooperation as can be seen in pharmaceuticals regulation.
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2 Context and Goals of European Market Entry Regulation
for Pharmaceuticals
2.1 The Context
The EEC was still in its infancy when the thalidomide catastrophe hit several
countries in which the medicine had been marketed in Europe and around the
world.6 By 1961 at the latest, it had become evident that taking this drug, which
was supposedly “one of the safest sedatives ever discovered,” (Silverman/Lee
1974: 94) could lead to fetal deformation in pregnant women. The country most
affected was Germany but, except for France and the USA,7 there have been vic-
tims in almost all highly developed societies. The thalidomide affair, though not
the only one during these decades, was classified as “the single most important
event to influence our attitudes to the unwanted effects of medicines” (McEwen
1999: 269). These revelations had immediate impact on policy discussions. For
practically all European countries it had become evident that effective pharma-
ceuticals regulation, able to protect the public from health hazards, was by and
large lacking. And, where a potentially adequate legal framework existed, as in
France, implementation deficits prevented it from being much more than an in-
strument to protect the home market. These events and the public discussions
they initiated shed light on the following characteristics of the policy problem
and its context:
– Due to scientific progress in pharmaceuticals research, the industrialization of
production and increasing internationalization of trade, different countries
were facing increasingly great and widespread risks at the same time.
– Voluntary intra-industry schemes of medicines control had failed, while public
pre-marketing controls were mostly absent, ineffectively designed or insuffi-
ciently implemented.
– While the internationalization of information through worldwide media cov-
erage was able to arouse suspicion and even panic for fear of dramatic nega-
tive events, the lack in international regulatory communication and coopera-
tion became even more evident.
                                                  
6 Descriptions of the events, their pharmacological background and the reaction of dif-
ferent actors in this policy domain are provided by Kirk (1999) for Germany and by
Silverman/Lee (1974) and Abraham (1995) mainly for the Anglo-Saxon world.
7 For quite different reasons the medicine had not been approved in both countries,
which were among the few that enjoyed a formal public approval procedure for
pharmaceuticals at that time. Nevertheless, some babies were affected in the USA be-
cause their mothers had taken thalidomide during pregnancy while travelling
abroad, through access to Canadian pharmacies or through doctors’ samples widely
distributed by the American company Merrell, which marketed the medicine in Can-
ada and was preparing market entrance in the USA (Silverman/Lee 1974: 96).
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At the same time, policies to cope with the perceived problems were available:
– Technologically the same scientific and technical knowledge and tools which
facilitated an increasingly systematized development of medicinal products
could also be used for regulatory controls of their quality, toxicity and efficacy.
– Successful national policy models existed which could inspire policy-making.8
Problem pressure was high enough – and viable solutions obviously available –
to prevent the handling of the situation by way of non-decisions or purely sym-
bolic politics.9 Risk-averse politicians had every incentive to create regulatory re-
gimes and systems which would not only increase the safety for patients but also
make it possible for governments to avoid blame if accidents should occur de-
spite regulatory precautions.10
It was in this context that the EEC – or more precisely the Commission – started
discussions about developing a harmonization strategy for pharmaceuticals
regulation in the early 1960s, as an attempt to standardize regulatory assessments
and evaluations in order to assure that equivalent national regulatory procedures
and decisions were in place. The thalidomide scandal actually marked a regula-
tory starting point for both the EC and the Member States. Therefore, one might
have expected a more unified approach from the very beginning. However, the
lack of rigorous regulatory legislation or implementation in the single Member
States did not signify the absence of nationally diverging conditions – be they
economic, political, legal, administrative or medical – when it came to the design
of a regulatory framework which would control the behavior of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, prescribe regulatory action to be taken by implementing admini-
strations and influence the availability of pharmaceuticals for medical therapies.
In fact, the Commission was well aware from the outset that differences in ad-
ministrative practice could always jeopardize the desired effects of legal har-
monization.11
                                                  
8 In the thirties the US had institutionalized quality- and safety-oriented marketing
authorization procedures entrusted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
These controls were tightened and extended to efficacy standards by the Kefauver-
Harris Amendments of 1962 as a reaction to the thalidomide scandal (Silverman/Lee
1974: 96). In Scandinavia, some rather strict licensing regulations had long been in
force – in Norway, for example, since 1928 and in Sweden since 1934 (Abraham/
Lewis 2000: 55; Dukes 1985).
9 It took some years, though, until effective control systems were installed in the dif-
ferent countries. For differences in policy-making speed, see Mayntz/Feick (1982)
and Feick (2000).
10 For a systematic discussion on strategies to avoid or to shift blame, see Hood (2002).
11 The European Commission expressed its skepticism about a purely legal harmoniza-
tion strategy only one year after the Council had adopted the General Programme on
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2.2 The Goals
The general goals of European pharmaceuticals regulation are straightforward. In
the words of the Pharmaceuticals Unit of the Enterprise Directorate-General, all
regulatory measures are supposed to ensure a high level of public health protec-
tion, to establish a single market and to provide a stable and predictable envi-
ronment for pharmaceutical innovation (DG Enterprise 2000b: 4). These goals are
mirrored in the different Council Directives and Regulations as well as in Com-
mission Communications, starting with the first harmonization directive of 1965
“on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administra-
tive action relating to medicinal products.” This states: “… the primary purpose
… must be to safeguard public health,” adding that this objective has to be
achieved without hindering “the development of the pharmaceutical industry or
trade in medicinal products within the Community.” The abolition of national
regulatory disparities through the “… approximation of the relevant provisions”
was meant to lead to “the establishment and functioning of the common market”
(European Council 1965: preamble).
While patients’ safety, public health protection, and industrial policy goals have
been common concerns of European and national policy-making alike, the spe-
cific European goal is linked to the creation of a Common Market (Art. 2 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community of 1957, as amended). Guarantee-
ing free trade among Member States and thus enabling the efficiencies of a larger
market (Cecchini et al. 1988: 5, 27), as well as contributing to the rationalization of
regulatory practice and the reduction of regulatory costs to industry (Deboyser
1995: 33) through substantive harmonization, procedural coordination and even
centralization were meant to maintain or strengthen the EU region as a competi-
tive research, development and production site especially vis-à-vis an increas-
ingly dominant US-American industry and rising Japanese industrial competi-
tion.12 The partly conflicting policy goals may be summed up as follows:
– Patient protection and public health contain two interrelated, in practice poten-
tially conflicting, goals. One goal is protective, namely to avoid or limit the risk
of distributing qualitatively inferior drugs, those with unacceptably severe
side effects and those with non-existing or unacceptably low therapeutic effi-
cacy. The complementary health goal is promotive and linked to the therapeu-
                                                                                                                                                 
legal harmonization with the goal of automatic mutual recognition (May 28, 1969).
Acknowledging that the Programme was a historical turning point with respect to
technical trade barriers, it made clear that their complete abolition might necessitate
EC implementation measures (Kommission und Gemeinschaften 1970: 127).
12 See a recent speech by the EU Commissioner for Enterprise and the Information So-
ciety, Eric Liikanen (Liikanen 2002).
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tic efficacy objective, namely to allow market entry for promising medicinal
treatments as fast as possible.
– The creation of an internal market is targeted at two groups. From the point of
view of the pharmaceuticals industry this means potential access to all Mem-
ber State markets for a medicine authorized within the EC, and from the point
of view of potential patients it means access to all pharmaceuticals available
within the EC.
– The industrial policy aim of supporting an innovative and competitive European
pharmaceuticals industry is twofold. Market entry regulation is intended to
promote the development of a larger-scale internal market and, thus, econo-
mies of scale. And the rationalization of regulatory procedures aims at reduc-
ing direct and indirect regulatory costs to industry and thereby providing in-
centives for research, development and production in Europe.
3 The Regulatory Development and the Changes in 1993
European market authorization for pharmaceuticals has traversed practically all
market integration strategies employed in the EC and, today, there co-exists a
regulatory policy-mix of different procedural solutions for the same basic task
within a harmonized legal framework. Up to the late 1980s, all attempts to pro-
vide for uniform marketing authorizations in the EC had, by and large, failed – be
it through an increasingly extensive and detailed harmonization of national leg-
islations in the hope that mutual recognition of national regulatory decisions
would come about, or through the subsequent introduction of cooperative or
concerted measures. National regulatory decision-making behavior differed too
much, revealing “that differences of opinion [in assessing and evaluating medici-
nal products] do exist” (DG Employment 1989: 5–6) and demonstrating the limits
of legal harmonization (Glaeske et al. 1988: 13–20). Those who would have pre-
ferred to cut the Gordian knot by a radical approach, namely the centralization of
marketing authorization at the European level,13 were convinced that the idea
was not realistic under the prevailing political conditions (Merkel 1988, in:
Glaeske et al.: 80). However, five years later the European Council opted for just
such a step, even though this was limited to the category of especially innovative
medicinal products.
                                                  
13 This policy idea had been brought up often since the first harmonization discussions
in the early sixties but it had always been abandoned as politically unacceptable – to
most of the Member States – and administratively unfeasible due to the lack of ad-
ministrative capacity with the Commission.
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3.1 The New Procedures of 1995/1998
In 1993, after two years of discussions, the European Council adopted three
pieces of legislation which introduced two new European authorization proce-
dures for the marketing of medicinal products for human use14: the Centralized
(CP) and the Mutual Recognition Procedures (MRP). These legislative reforms
were further developments of already existing “European” procedures which in-
troduced some radical structural changes. The new CP replaced the Concertation
Procedure, which had come into effect in 1987 (Council Directive 87/22/EEC)
and required European-level pre-assessments and pre-evaluations for specific
categories of pharmaceuticals – the same categories still applicable in the CP – be-
fore the single national authories made their nationally valid regulatory deci-
sions. But the national regulators were not obliged to follow the European rec-
ommendations. The MRP15 replaced the Multi-state Procedure introduced in 1975
and revised in 1983, which involved a regime of sequential or parallel reviews of
national applications by national regulatory authorities and called for some inter-
agency communication and cooperation but led to little convergence concerning
the final national marketing authorization decisions. Thus, both preceding
“European” procedures somehow accompanied national regulatory decision-
making but did not replace it.16 The result of the reform legislation of 1995 is the
remarkable range of three alternative regulatory routes for pharmaceuticals’
marketing authorization in the EC:
1. the different national procedures (NP) for marketing in one country only (excep-
tion: medicinal products for which alternative 3 is obligatory);
2. a Decentralized or Mutual Recognition Procedure (MRP) whenever a pharmaceu-
tical product is to be marketed in more than one Member State (exception:
medicines for which alternative 3 is obligatory);
3. an integrated Centralized Procedure (CP) for specific categories of pharmaceuti-
cals – obligatory for category A pharmaceuticals (derived from biotechnologi-
                                                  
14 The three texts are Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2309/93 of July 22, 1993, Council
Directive 93/39/EEC and Council Directive 93/41 EEC, adopted on June 14, 1993
and in force since January 1, 1995 and 1998 respectively.
15 This introduction of the MRP included a transition phase from January 1, 1995, to
December 31, 1997, during which multiple national procedures co-existed alongside
the MRP.
16 However, it seems fair to say that both preceding procedures contributed quite a lot
in terms of mutual inter-agency understanding and the Europeanization of a profes-
sional and regulatory dialog. Without these advances in discourse capability over
several decades, Europeanized regulatory procedures could not have been expected
to work at all.
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cal research and production), optional for category B pharmaceuticals (inno-
vative medicines – mainly new active substances – outside category A). 17
While surprising at first sight, this variety of regulatory options for the same task
does take into account the multitude of orientations and interests which have had
to be accommodated:
A variety of interests within the pharmaceutical industry are accounted for by the
different procedural options. Internationally oriented and research-intensive
pharmaceutical companies are prepared to face fairly strict control measures on
the basis of contemporary scientific evidence. They are best served by a uniform
centralized procedure that opens up the large Common Market in one regulatory
step, thus reducing regulatory costs and speeding up market access. Companies
producing more traditional medicines, targeting smaller, sometimes only na-
tional, markets and, to a certain extent, less prepared to fulfill strictly imple-
mented harmonized regulatory requirements are better served by the NP or
MRP, where the peculiarities of national regulatory environments – including
traditional therapeutic traditions and specialties – have a greater chance of being
respected.
A similar distinction of interests can be made with respect to health care profession-
als and patient groups, depending largely on their therapeutic convictions. The
available regulatory procedures allow for a variety of therapeutic options, in-
cluding what might be called traditional or alternative medicinal therapies, which
are often only of regional interest. The risks of these kinds of products failing a
centralized assessment and evaluation procedure are higher, since such a proce-
dure is biased towards stricter scientific evidence.
The regulatory orientations and preferences of national authorities vary also with
respect to pharmaceutical, medical or regulatory traditions. There is nevertheless
a common institutional interest in organizational influence and survival in the
face of potentially menacing institutional centralization. The NP and the MRP al-
low a high degree of national autonomy to be maintained in regulatory decision-
making. And even the uniform CP is designed in a way that integrates the na-
tional authorities as indispensable providers of assessments and evaluations.
Autonomy, on the one hand, and participatory inclusion, on the other, preserve
the existence and regulatory autonomy or influence of national authorities.
Less well served within this institutional structure are the “interests” of those
specialized patient or consumer protection groups or individual professionals
                                                  
17 For the definition of the two categories, see ANNEX to Council Regulation (EEC) No.
2309/93 of July 22, 1993.
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who regard themselves as watchdogs of a regulatory power structure which, in
their view, is biased towards the preferences of industry (Abbasi/Herxheimer
1998; Abraham/Sheppard/Reed 1999; Abraham/Lewis 2000). Their demand for
greater transparency in assessment and evaluation procedures, including the
documents underlying them (test results etc.), has been, by and large, ignored.
Transparency, so their criticism, has generally been sacrificed in Europe on the
altar of industrial and administrative secrecy.
3.2 The Main Characteristics of the Two European Procedures
The Centralized Procedure
Where the Centralized Procedure (Figure 1) applies,18 regulatory decisions have
to be taken at the European level and are valid in all Member States. There is no
way for either applicants or national authorities to circumvent this decision-
making process if an EC-wide application is obligatory or optionally sought.
Within a certain, relatively calculable time span, a final decision has to be pro-
duced and directly presented to the individual applicant. The latter may with-
draw during the procedure, but then the only remaining option is to re-apply
later on in the framework of the CP. Member States have no exit option and must
participate actively if they want to influence the collective decision. Singular veto
positions do not exist.19
Formally the regulatory procedure is divided into a scientific assessment and
evaluation (EMEA/CPMP and external experts) and an administrative/political
decision process (European Commission and comitology procedure) very much
along the analytical lines drawn by S. Breyer’s distinction between scientific
regulatory “assessment” and administrative regulatory “management” (Breyer
1993). The function of the first part is to provide a decision recommendation
based on scientific evidence and professional logic. This is supposed to establish
                                                  
18 The Centralized Procedure is obligatory for Part A pharmaceuticals (medicinal prod-
ucts developed by means of specific biotechnical processes such as recombinant
DNA technology) and optional for Part B pharmaceuticals (medicinal products that
are innovative in some other significant way such as the type of therapy, delivery
systems or manufacturing, or the novelty of the active substance). See Annex to
Council Regulation (EEC) 2309/93, 22 July 1993.
19 Once a centrally approved medicinal product is on the market, a Member State may
recall it individually as a measure of pharmacovigilance based on Art. 30 (former
Art. 36) TEC. But such a national measure to protect public health is valid only tem-
porarily. It must be reviewed by the European institutions (EMEA/CPMP, Commis-
sion) and finally decided upon within this institutional framework.
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the basis for the regulatory decision to be taken in Brussels since the Commission
is legally prohibited from delegating regulatory decision-making power.
A first decision draft – based on the opinion delivered by EMEA – is prepared by
the Pharmaceuticals Unit of the Directorate-General (DG) Enterprise and circu-
lated within the Commission among the other relevant DGs. The Commission’s
draft is then communicated to the Member States represented on the Standing
Committee. The acceptance of this draft depends on the approval of the Standing
Committee, which decides by qualified majority vote. If this Committee does not
approve, the Council becomes involved – which has never happened to date –
and can either not respond (the Commission’s proposal would then be imple-
mented) or adopt or modify the proposal by qualified majority, or refuse it by
simple majority (a practice which is likely to change to qualified majority as a re-
sult of the ongoing review).
In between these procedural steps, specific scientific/technical questions might
again be addressed to the scientific committee (CPMP) at the newly established
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products via the Commission,
which would eventually change its decision draft on the basis of new or addi-
tional recommendations. Only in very rare cases – two were mentioned in inter-
views – has the Standing Committee asked for further clarifying discussions in
the CPMP at EMEA. In these cases, the final results upheld the CPMP’s former
position.20
EMEA is of central importance in this framework since it is responsible for coor-
dinating the scientific assessment and evaluation process and delivering an
opinion to the Commission and the Member States. EMEA’s Committee for Pro-
prietary Medicinal Products performs the scientific assessments and professional
evaluations, and is formally independent in its deliberations from both European
and national administrations. Although the authorization decision is taken in
Brussels, it is actually the CPMP’s evaluation which pre-determines the final out-
come. Thus, informally, centralization is even stronger in this regulatory proce-
dure than seems to be the case from looking at the legal framework.
The Centralized Procedure can be regarded as a joint decision-making process21
orchestrated by the European Commission, but containing especially strong cen-
tralizing elements which tend to dominate the whole procedure (see below). The
restriction of the CP to the most innovative medicines facilitates consensus-build-
                                                  
20 It is interesting that these two questions arose after the CPMP had arrived at its
opinion by majority vote, not by consensus, which is normally sought and attained.
21 For a classification of decision-making modes in European integration, see Scharpf
(2001b).
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Figure 1 Centralized Procedure: Supranational and Intergovernmental
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ing in the CPMP, a consensus which is difficult to challenge since it is founded on
the expertise and collective deliberations of national regulators. The sophisticated
structure of this Europeanized procedure provides ample opportunities for na-
tional experts and national authorities’ representatives to bring their specific as-
sessment and evaluation views to bear at different points. But in the end it is
European decisions that have to be taken – scientific assessments by consensus or
absolute majority (CPMP) and regulatory decisions by qualified majority (Stand-
ing Committee, Council).
Some of the institutions and committees that have been created function more
like supranational bodies (CPMP/EMEA, Commission), others more like inter-
governmental ones (Standing Committee, Council).22 The way they deal with the
issues resembles in one regulatory context more deliberative problem-solving
(CPMP), in others it is closer to a negotiating attitude (Standing Committee,
Council). Empirically, it is rather difficult to distinguish deliberative from nego-
tiative interactions (Joerges 2000). Participants will readily agree that even in such
a scientifically oriented body as the CPMP negotiations can be necessary when it
comes to the precise wording of regulatory recommendations such as the Sum-
maries of Product Characteristics. They are well aware that their collective rec-
ommendation has to pass the qualified majority gate of administrative regulatory
decision-making in Brussels.
The Centralized Procedure has been restricted to the most innovative pharma-
ceutical products for several reasons.23 Administratively this new Centralized
Procedure was a considerable challenge to the Commission. Nobody wanted the
procedure to fail due to work overload, which would strangle the new agency
(EMEA). It was also a challenge to the consensus-building capacity of the collec-
tive bodies involved. Nobody wanted the deliberations and negotiations to be
driven into highly controversial pharmacological, medical and administrative is-
sues. With the technologically and medically most innovative medicines, the
chances of reaching scientific and professional consensus have been higher24 and
the risks that national regulatory traditions would obstruct intended Europeani-
zation have been lower.
                                                  
22 In practice, it is difficult to make empirically meaningful distinctions between supra-
nationally or intergovernmentally oriented institutional interactions (Schmidt 1996).
23 The legal amendments under way in the legislative review will probably open the CP
for a wider spectrum of pharmaceuticals, e.g. for all new active substances.
24 In fact, the CPMP, which may decide by absolute majority vote, normally reaches
opinions by consensus: Of the 123 positive opinions in the years 1995 to 1999 (during
which time there were only 7 negative opinions), 107 were consensual (Sauer 2000: 4).
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The Mutual Recognition Procedure – Really European?
In contrast to the Centralized Procedure, the Mutual Recognition Procedure (Fig-
ure 2) is the “weaker” form of regulatory Europeanization although some supra-
national elements distinguish it from its predecessor, the so-called Multi-state
Procedure introduced in 1975 and amended in 1983. The national level still domi-
nates regulatory decision-making even though this procedure formally allows for
a supranational, European stage, which is rarely attained in practice. The Com-
mission and industry alike had hoped that the newly designed procedure would
assure mutual recognition, i.e. the adoption of the Reference Member State’s
(RMS) initial evaluation and regulatory decision by the Concerned Member
State(s) (CMS) where the applicant had additionally applied for marketing au-
thorization. Mutual recognition or uniformity of national regulatory decisions
with respect to the same medicinal product was to be facilitated by a two-stage
process.
At the first stage the dissenting CMS(s) will communicate the issues hindering
mutual recognition, followed by a so-called “breakout” session.25 In such a meet-
ing, in which the RMS and the CMS(s) are supposed to participate26 and which is
headed by the RMS’s authority, the disputed parts of the assessment and evalua-
tion are meant to be resolved. In practice, however, this is a rather complicated
undertaking since the RMS’s regulatory authority has already made its decision.
It is difficult for a dissenting CMS to retract its opinion and adopt the RMS’s po-
sition once it has refused automatic mutual recognition because of “serious con-
cerns”27 to public health in their countries. The other possibility of finding a
compromise position would require a change in the RMS’s initial authorization.
This is no less complicated since a legally valid national authorization already
exists furnishing the authorization holder with a right to market in the RMS. The
latter’s cooperation would be necessary in this case. Additionally, this approach
would also require changes in the position of all those CMSs which are prepared
to mutually recognize the RMS’s initial decision.28
                                                  
25 These take place monthly on the premises of the EMEA, parallel to the meetings of
the CPMP and the so-called Mutual Recognition Facilitation Group (see below).
26 Participation often does not turn out as expected. Consenting CMS authorities which
support the RMS’s position are generally absent, and even dissenting CMSs do not
always attend, partly due to lacking resources, especially on the part of the smaller
authorities.
27 These are the only grounds on which mutual recognition may be refused.
28 The ongoing legislative review is heading for a change in the following direction:
Whenever applications are made in the RMS and the CMS(s) at the same time, the
RMS’s regulatory authority will not make its final decision until it has discussed its
assessment and evaluation with the CMS(s)’s authorities.
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Figure 2 Mutual Recognition Procedure: National, Interadministrative and Supranational
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Furthermore, the applicant would also run the risk of an unfavorable arbitration
result at the European level, which would then be binding for all national
authorities to which he has applied.29
The MRP contains two different types of attempts to arrive at regulatory Europe-
anization. At the first stage, independent national authorities discuss their assess-
ments and evaluations in order to try to find a common position. Ideally, this can
be understood as a problem-solving attempt to find the best answer to the as-
sessment and evaluation problem without obliging the national authorities to ac-
cept or apply any proposal.30 These discussions nevertheless take place in the
framework of maximally harmonized regulatory legislation and on the basis of
legal communication and interaction requirements. The second stage in this regu-
latory procedure is meant to lead to binding arbitration at the supranational level,
which in practice means a harmonization of national regulatory decisions. The
conflicting issues following national assessments and evaluations would be re-
solved through formulating a single European position which has to be adopted
by the national authorities. The Commission, a Member State or the applicant can
all request binding arbitration. As mentioned above, applications rarely reach this
second stage due to the withdrawal behavior of applicant firms. This behavior of
firms actually facilitates the national authorities’ dominance in this procedure.
Given its quantitative importance at the European level (see Table 5), it provides
many options for national authorities and applying firms to deprive it of its Eu-
ropeanization potential, whose realization depends on the combined voluntarism
(Streeck 1995) of the national authorities and the applying firms.
4 European Governing and National Autonomy
The following part of this paper deals with questions of European governing in
market entry regulation for pharmaceuticals and the balance struck between
European regulatory uniformity and national autonomy by and in the different
                                                  
29 The so-called Mutual Recognition Facilitation Group (MRFG), informally established
by the heads of the national regulatory authorities and made up of representatives
from the national regulatory authorities, meets quasi-officially every month along-
side the CPMP at the EMEA; a Commission representative also attends the meetings.
The MRFG tries to smooth out procedural difficulties and discusses more general
problems of mutual recognition. It does not deal with individual procedures.
30 Here, of course, the interactions of committees and authorities are similar to those in
the CP: the reasons for disagreement may not only be of a scientific or technical na-
ture but also administrative or political in a wider sense, and the interactions can
contain deliberations as well as negotiations.
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regulatory regimes. First, the different procedures will be discussed on the basis
of process-produced data and observations by participating actors. Together with
the institutional insights gained above, this discussion will lead us, in the second
part, to an interpretation of the available procedural regimes in terms of the op-
portunities open to actors and the constraints imposed on them in pursuing strate-
gies which foster or hinder the effective Europeanization of governance functions,
on the one hand, and preserve or limit national regulatory autonomy, on the other.
4.1 Implementation: How the Procedures Are Utilized and Perceived
The Centralized Procedure
Since its inauguration in 1995 there has been an overall increase in the utilization
of the Centralized Procedure in terms of annual applications (see Table 1). Appli-
cations for category A pharmaceuticals are quantitatively, but – due to their in-
novativeness – not qualitatively, less important than those for category B phar-
maceuticals. The application figures for category B are indicative of the general
acceptance of this procedure since the firms applying could have chosen the
Mutual Recognition Procedure instead.
Some data in this table point at significant differences between the two product
categories. Applications for A pharmaceuticals (obligatory) display a more steady
development; larger fluctuations can be observed for the B category (optional).
These fluctuations are not surprising,31 since companies might have experi-
mented with the CP in choosing purposefully between the two European proce-
dures and reacting to their specific procedural experiences. They might also have
been trying out the CP for products whose “dossier” has not been adequate for
this potentially more demanding procedure (see the high number of withdraw-
als). Application fluctuations can, of course, also depend on fluctuations in the
development pipeline of pharmaceutical companies.32
Part A pharmaceuticals are much less prone to be withdrawn by an applicant and
much less frequently receive a negative opinion by the CPMP than Part B medici-
nal products. Here, too, it seems plausible that the specific characteristics of cate-
gory B medicines (not as innovative) and of the applying firms (on average not as
well adapted to the exigencies of the CP) might account for the greater degree of
withdrawals and negative assessments.33
                                                  
31 Unfortunately there are no separate data available for Part B pharmaceuticals as to the
utilization of the different regulatory options open to applicants (CR, MRP or national).
32 Interview D–2002 –1a.
33 Regulatory authorities see the main reason for withdrawals in premature applica-
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The Mutual Recognition Procedure
Data for the Mutual Recognition Procedure (see Table 2) are more difficult to ob-
tain since the procedure itself lacks an official coordinating center. Most data are
assembled by the informal, though quasi-official, Mutual Recognition Facilitation
Group. Quantitatively, the MRP is the more important of the two European mar-
keting authorization procedures and its number also shows gradual yearly in-
creases. Yet, at the same time, the data signify to what extent the procedure does
not work as intended. What has been criticized with respect to the preceding
multi-state procedure is still valid today: “la reconnaissance mutuelle automa-
tique est une utopie dans ce secteur” (Deboyser 1991: 127).
The relatively high number of “breakout sessions” (cf. Figure 2), organized in or-
der to resolve deviations in scientific assessment and professional evaluation
between the Reference Member State and one or several Concerned Member
States, and the high number of withdrawals by applicants despite these attempts
are regarded as a matter of concern. They indicate the degree to which national
                                                                                                                                                 
tions (DG Enterprise 2000a: 114–115). It should be noted that negative opinions by
the CPMP are counted as such only when the procedure has been finalized at EMEA.
Since companies generally withdraw when expecting a negative opinion, this figure
should be higher.
Table 1   European Centralized Procedure:  Part A and B Pharmaceuticals
(new applications only)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1995–2001
Applications received Part A 15 14 19 14 18 17 23 120
Part B 19 23 43 30 29 38 33 215
Withdrawals of applications Part A 0 0 3 8 1 0 3 15
Part B 1 5 2 11 7 11 8 45
Withdrawals in % of applications Part A 12.50%
Part B 20.93%
Negative opinions by CPMP Part A 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Part B 0 0 0 2 4 0 1 7
Marketing authorizations Part A 2 10 13 3 12 16 15 71
Part B 0 15 12 33 18 17 28 123
Pharmaceutical products for human use only. Applications in one year might not have been withdrawn or
processed in the same year. Negative opinions are only counted for procedures finalized at EMEA, i.e. the
numbers of withdrawals are hiding expected negative opinions.
Sources: EMEA annual reports; EMEA press releases and monthly reports; personal communication with
EMEA.
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regulators raise “serious concerns” about public health regarding the RMS’s pre-
ceding regulatory decision. The low number of arbitration referrals leading to
binding assessments and evaluations at the European level is also revealing. Ap-
plying companies avoid binding arbitration procedures by choosing the exit op-
tion: withdrawal of the application from the CMS that remains unwilling to mu-
tually recognize the RMS’s regulatory decision even after breakout sessions.
Some would argue that the figures on withdrawals have shown signs of im-
provement since 1999; still, this is not what one might call an effectively Europe-
anized regulatory procedure.
The MRFG has undertaken a detailed study of MRPs finalized between April 1
and September 30, 2000, in order to unveil the causes for the high number of with-
drawals in this procedure (MRFG 2001). As Table 2 shows, an application was
withdrawn in at least one Concerned Member State in more than 30% of all MRPs
in the year 2000. The MRFG’s analysis reveals the following, interesting details:
– One country alone, France, has been responsible for almost half of the with-
drawals.
– One group of pharmaceuticals, generics, has been affected by almost half of the
withdrawals.
– In more than half of the cases the reason for withdrawal has been differences of
opinion between a Reference Member State and Concerned Member State(s)
with respect to the SPC (Summary of Product Characteristics).34
                                                  
34 SPCs are an integral part of a marketing authorization “which is granted only pro-
Table 2   The Decentralized Procedure: Mutual Recognition (new applications only)
1995–1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1995–2001
Procedures submitted (total) 361 183 275 373 484 1676
Arbitration referrals 3 1 2 3 1 10
Breakout sessions 84 64 48 52 36 284
Procedures finalized 240 182 228 306 443 1399
Procedures finalized with
at least one CMS withdrawna 46% 47% 28% 30.5%
% of withdrawn national
applications related to all CMSsa 12% 16.5% 8.2% 7.6%
Pharmaceutical products for human use. Applications in one year might not have been processed or with-
drawn in the same year.
a MRFG (2001).
Sources: EMEA annual reports; MRFG (2002); own calculations.
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These three observations are interrelated. SPCs for generic pharmaceutical prod-
ucts often deviate from SPCs of the original or reference product, especially if the
product was authorized years ago, and the French authority pursues the strict
policy of not accepting differing SPC contents for medicines that are basically the
same.35
The in-depth analysis also revealed that whenever a new chemical entity was
subject to the MRP, similar assessments and evaluations by national authorities
and, as a consequence, mutual recognition were much more likely. New chemical
entities have been involved in withdrawals in only 10% of the cases. Here, again,
it seems that the novelty of a medicine is an important factor for regulatory con-
vergence.
General Perception of the Two Procedures
The Centralized Procedure is perceived as functioning more or less as expected
and as being utilized more than was expected. Table 3 shows a very high level of
general satisfaction with the CP, the regulators’ positive reaction being even more
pronounced than that of marketing authorization holders (pharmaceutical com-
panies). As a rule of thumb, the companies’ level of satisfaction “tended to be
lower if they had experience of withdrawing a product” (DG Enterprise 2000a: 72).
For the MRP the picture is not as bright and not as uniform. While a large major-
ity of regulatory administrations approve of this procedure, the responses of
market-authorization holding companies tends to be split between those who are
dissatisfied and a smaller, though still substantial, group of positive respondents.
The national authorities’ generally positive view of the MRP can be easily ex-
plained by the fact that it preserves the national authorities’ autonomy. The split
within industry is related to company-specific regulatory needs and experiences.
Most companies would not like to be without the MRP because it adds to the
freedom of choice between alternative regulatory regimes. It provides flexibility
                                                                                                                                                 
vided the indications, conditions for use, composition of the medicinal product, etc.
strictly comply with the corresponding description” (Brunet 1999: 160).
35 The reasons for this especially strict national position are not just related to evalua-
tion issues concerning marketing authorization. Socio-economic regulations in the
health insurance field that deal with prescriptions, i.e. aut-idem (substitution of
similar medicines by pharmacists) and reimbursement rules seem to play an impor-
tant role, too (personal communication by P. Urfalino and B. Hauray). The French
regulation that allows pharmacists to substitute a generic for a prescribed brand of a
medicinal product could become impracticable if the SPCs and package leaflets for
basically the same products vary with respect to indications, contraindications, side
effects, etc. There are efforts under way to have national SPCs harmonized by the
CPMP, a task which would probably take many years to accomplish.
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with respect to the choice of countries targeted for marketing and, also, the choice
of the Reference Member State providing the lead assessment and evaluation. But
there is dissatisfaction with the malfunctioning of mutual recognition and the in-
efficiencies of the procedure whenever an agreement cannot be obtained between
the Reference Member State and dissenting Concerned Member States.
4.2 Europeanization, National Authorities, and Applicants
The regulation of marketing authorizations for pharmaceuticals in the EC with its
mix of regulatory procedures may be taken as a sector-specific example of how a
balance is being struck between the centralization of regulatory decision-making
power at the European level and the preservation of national autonomy and/or
influence. The difficulties of developing positive European policies to offset, on
the one hand, decreasing Member State control capacities in an increasingly
transnational market or to establish, on the other hand, such a transnational Sin-
gle Market initially in certain sectors such as pharmaceuticals, have been widely
described (see, for example, Scharpf 1992: 24–26). Consensus in the European
Council – legislation in public health matters requires unanimity – is especially
difficult to obtain if European interventions have or are expected to have impor-
tant distributive effects, and/or if they necessitate changes in established national
implementation structures and practices (Scharpf 1992: 26). If European regula-
tion in this field is supposed to be effective, then its implementation has to over-
come or influence national regulatory traditions, including implementation
structures, and its outcomes risk having an impact on the competitive situation of
national pharmaceutical industries and, more indirectly, on the national provi-
Table 3   Overall Satisfaction with the European Procedures (number and percentages
of respondents)
Centralized procedure Decentralized procedure
Dissatisfied/
very
dissatisfied
Satisfied Very
satisfied
Dissatisfied/
very
dissatisfied
Satisfied Very
satisfied
Marketing
authorization
holders
3
(9%)
28
(88%)
1
(3%)
29
(56%)
22
(42%)
1
(2%)
Regulatory
authorities
in the EU
0 12
(75%)
4
(25%)
3
(20%)
12
(80%)
0
Pharmaceutical products for human use.
Source: DG Enterprise (2000a: 72–73, 122).
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sion of medicinal health care as a whole. Scharpf’s judgement that the regulation
of product standards should be the easier task for European intervention and
even be a candidate for the most invasive mode of European integration – that of
hierarchical direction – certainly contains an element of truth. But his assumption
that institutional as well as cultural national differences should be less of an ob-
stacle (Scharpf 1995: 94) somehow gainsays the decades of European experience
in pharmaceuticals control. In the end, policy mixes have had to be allowed for
and complex implementation procedures have had to be set in place which are
heedful of the political and institutional autonomy and/or influence of national
polities while at the same time providing for more European uniformity in regu-
latory implementation or even introducing a completely Europeanized procedure
(Scharpf 1994).36
The following analysis will concentrate on the two European procedures, leaving
the purely national procedure aside, since this is the one in which national auton-
omy clearly dominates implementation within an otherwise extensively harmo-
nized legal framework. Two analytical concepts will be applied: Scharpf’s dis-
tinctions between different modes of European integration and Hirschman’s no-
tion of “exit” and “voice” in the sense of institutionalized behavioral alternatives
in a collective setting.
Scharpf’s Europeanization modes allow us to distinguish the regulatory proce-
dures or elements thereof with respect to supranational European integration, on
the one hand, and national autonomy on the other (Scharpf 2001b: 6–19). They
can be ranked according to their invasive strength, starting with the weakest
mode:
– Mutual adjustment presupposes completely independent national governments
deciding on their own, while being aware of mutually interdependent effects.
– In the open coordination mode, governments would also be independent in their
decisions but embedded in collective evaluatory discussions at the European
level, without formal obligations but with a certain self-binding commitment.
– Intergovernmental negotiations are conducted by independent governments act-
ing within well-defined institutional structures (participation, voting rules) in
order to arrive at collectively binding decisions.
– Joint decision-making is a combination of two pure models – of intergovern-
mental negotiations and of hierarchical direction: Centralizing elements coexist
alongside negotiation processes, and the success of the whole procedure de-
                                                  
36 For further elaborations of different modes of integration in the context of European
multi-level governing, see Scharpf (1996, 2001b, 2002).
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pends on the functioning of the center’s coordination capacities and on the
readiness of participating national authorities to converge their preferences.
– In the hierarchical/central direction mode, decision-making competencies are
centralized at the supranational level, and national governments are not in a
position to prevent them from being exercised.
The other analytical categories applied are Hirschman’s notion of “exit” and
“voice.” In this analysis “exit” relates to the autonomy of actors to leave a given
situation of collective decision-making and to (re)gain an autonomous regulatory
position. “Voice,” on the other hand, is related to integrative Europeanization or,
in Hirschman’s perspective: “Integration can … be considered as an arrangement,
not for suppressing voice through hierarchy, but rather institutionalizing and
routinizing it” (Hirschman 1981 [1974]: 222–223).
In contrast to the analyses from which Scharpf has derived his analytical catego-
rization, which are mainly policy-making processes, we focus here on policy out-
put in terms of institutionalized regulatory procedures, and on the way in which
both their institutional design and their utilization determine the functioning of
the procedures as means of European governing. Having highlighted the crucial
differences between the two European regulatory regimes of marketing authori-
zation above, we can now concentrate on a more focused analytical discussion.
The Centralized Procedure – Hierarchy, Voice and Negotiations
At first sight the Centralized Procedure (Figure 1) might be regarded as an exam-
ple of the central direction mode. The procedure is institutionalized at the central
European level, obligatory for certain medicinal products and conducive to
genuinely European regulatory decisions, which are directed at individual appli-
cants and binding in all Member States. Neither national governments, nor their
regulatory authorities, nor applicants can evade this regulatory frame. National
autonomy seems to be non-existent. For a more precise analysis it is necessary to
look at the different phases and the distinctive institutional elements.
In the first phase scientific-professional assessment and evaluation is conducted in
a centralized institutional setting. This work is coordinated by an independent
European agency (EMEA), executed by the formally independent, scientific com-
mittee of this agency, the CPMP, and addressed to the Commission via an opin-
ion which contains a recommendation for the regulatory decision to be taken. As
these recommendations in almost all cases predetermine the decisions taken
within a comitology procedure in Brussels, this centralized institutional element
of the first phase is much more important than the term “recommendation”
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might indicate. This institutional asymmetry between European and national in-
stitutions is – at least partly – counterbalanced by participatory opportunities.
The CPMP is composed of nationally based experts from all the national regula-
tory authorities. Furthermore, for every single application, two “rapporteurs” are
chosen by the CPMP to prepare and deliver detailed assessment reports to be dis-
cussed in plenary sessions. Since the assessments of the rapporteurs are produced
mainly in the respective national regulatory authorities, these national institu-
tions still have an important, though not decisive part to play in this phase. Deci-
sions in the CPMP are collectively taken – discussions leading to consensus or, in
rare cases, to majority voting –, but this first phase provides for multiple oppor-
tunities to introduce and discuss national assessment and evaluation positions.
Nevertheless, on the whole, European integration is at a maximum in this phase,
whereas national autonomy is at a minimum, though compensated for by partici-
patory means (“voice”).
The second phase leads to the administrative regulatory decision and is coordi-
nated by the European Commission at the center. The latter transforms the rec-
ommendations into regulatory decision drafts. To become valid administrative
acts, at least one additional committee – the Standing Committee on Medicinal
Products for Human Use – becomes involved, the logic of whose interactions in-
clines towards the negotiative rather than the deliberative pole. The involvement
of this Committee, whose members are representatives of national authorities,
provides the opportunity to (re)introduce clearly national points of view. A quali-
fied majority, with votes weighed according to Art. 205 (2) TEC (new), is neces-
sary for a positive decision to be taken; anything else would lead to the involve-
ment of the Council – a situation which has not yet occurred. The Council would
also decide by qualified majority if it adopts or alters the decision proposal; plain
refusal would be possible by simple majority.37 In any event, no single national
authority or Member State is in a strong veto position. The Commission’s deci-
sion proposal can only be modified or rejected by a rather large coalition.
Looking at the whole procedure, this second phase formally turns the mode of
integration into that of joint decision-making, though without the opportunity for
single Member States to block a decision. The further the decision process moves
along the different phases and up the institutional ladder, the more it becomes
                                                  
37 According to the new comitology procedure (Council Decision 1999468/EC of 28
June 1999) the Council now can oppose Commission proposals only by qualified
majority (whereas, before, a simple majority was required). Furthermore, the Euro-
pean Parliament will be informed of the Commission’s proposal and may confront
the Council with an opinion that the Commission has exceeded its implementing
powers. The Council has to respond decisively to such an opinion expressed by the
European Parliament.
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“administrative” or “political,” and the more the potential for intergovernmental
or interadministrative negotiations increases. However, since the Commission’s
decision draft – generally identical with the regulatory agency’s centrally deter-
mined opinion – will only be overturned under exceptional circumstances, the
whole Centralized Procedure might be classified as an integration or Europeani-
zation mode where, in practice, hierarchical – or, better still, central – direction
dominates. But this central direction is complemented and, thus, cushioned by
opportunities for nationally oriented experts to provide an input and for authori-
ties to raise their voice, on the one hand. On the other, this central direction is
taking place “in the shadow”of the “threat” that national authorities might fall
back upon interadministrative or intergovernmental negotiations whenever ad-
ministrative or political bodies like the Standing Committee or the Council – or,
within the new comitology procedure, the Parliament – come to the conclusion
that the Commission, in drafting its decision, has exceeded its implementation
competencies (European Parliament) or arrived at positions which are unaccept-
able to a large enough group of countries (Standing Committee, Council).
The Mutual Recognition Procedure – Missed Europeanization Potential
The Mutual Recognition Procedure (see Figure 2) represents two opposite logics.
One of them is based on the mutual recognition of national regulatory decisions
which, themselves, should be an implementation of the extensively harmonized
legislation. The other – and this is the main innovation in comparison with the
preceding multi-state procedure – is the potential to include a genuinely Europe-
anized decision process whenever the mutual recognition mechanism does not
work as intended. These two logics correspond with the procedural distinction of
two phases.
The first phase comes close to an open coordination process in which different na-
tional regulatory authorities are supposed to cooperate in a way that produces a
uniform implementation decision on the basis of the existing harmonized legisla-
tion. Concerned Member States are supposed to recognize, but have the excep-
tional right to oppose, the Reference Member State’s initial regulatory decision if
serious concerns about public health can be advanced by the opposing national
authority (Council 1975: Art. 10, 1).38 Such a challenge has to be discussed among
the Member State authorities with the aim, but not the obligation, to come to an
agreement. Although the procedure has been designed to arrive at identical deci-
sions in all Member States targeted by the applicant, the legal obligation to coop-
                                                  
38 This leads to the much-criticized practice that national authorities claim this excep-
tional reason even in the case of minor objections. Up to now, attempts to define ex-
actly just what constitutes a “serious concern” have failed.
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erate and the institutional support for cooperation are so weak that national
authorities can easily choose between “exit” and “voice” or, more correctly, opt to
“exit” if “voice” has gone unheeded. The MRP even contains a kind of self-
defeating mechanism: although the national authorities of the CMSs are not sup-
posed to carry out intensive assessments of the applications, this being the RMS’s
task, they are practically obliged to do so in order to identify reasons for serious
concern. And this practice, in turn, increases the chances of identifying discrepan-
cies between the RMS’s and CMSs’ positions.
The second phase is the sequence which should follow if the open coordination at-
tempt fails. This would turn the MRP into a real European regulatory procedure.
If implementation moves on to this second stage of centralized binding arbitra-
tion, then the same integration modes would prevail which characterize the Cen-
tralized Procedure – that of hierarchical (central) direction and joint decision-making
(see above, 4.2.1). The marketing authorizations delivered to the applicants
would still be national ones, but their content would be made uniform through
binding arbitration by European institutions. Yet as we have seen above, the pro-
cess only very rarely moves into the second phase even when mutual recognition
is not attained in all CMSs.
Implementation practice shows that this potentially European procedure remains
very much in the open coordination mode. The reason for this is the strategic be-
havior of those applying companies for whom it is generally economically ad-
vantageous to withdraw their application from dissenting national authorities in
order to avoid time-consuming and potentially risky arbitration (DG Enterprise
2000a: 135, 144). Thus, in the case of the MRP, effective Europeanization depends
on the voluntarism of national authorities to cooperate and adjust in regulatory
implementation and of pharmaceutical companies to accept arbitration. The
MRP’s institutional set-up invites strategic use by the “non-integrative” actors.
The flexibility built into this procedure and welcomed by national authorities and
industry alike – albeit for different reasons – protects the dominance of national
autonomy and adjustments to national preferences to the detriment of uniform
Europe-wide implementation of European standards.
Procedural Variety: Constraints, Opportunities and Interests
Although, both the Centralized Procedure and the Mutual Recognition Procedure
have been designed as Europeanized regulatory procedures, their general insti-
tutional logics work in opposite directions. Furthermore, even within the single
procedures, phases can be distinguished which provide institutional options that
again follow different modes of Europeanization. And finally it is the preferences
of participating actors and the constraints and opportunities provided by the in-
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stitutionalized procedures on which the realization of the different Europeaniza-
tion modes depends.
The main general institutional difference between the two procedures is that the
CP necessarily arrives at a European regulatory decision taken by European
bodies whose decision output is directed at individual applicants, while in the
MRP the national level’s regulatory decisions are relevant for the individual ap-
plicants.
The CP contains two phase-dependent modes, one leaning towards central direc-
tion, the other towards joint decision-making. Owing to the informal weight of
the centrally established scientific assessment and evaluation and the succeeding
regulatory recommendation as well as the institutional hurdles to decisive na-
tional opposition in the second phase, the CP as a whole resembles hierarchical or
central direction. It is the most invasive mode of European integration, leaving
practically no space for nationally autonomous regulation. Effective European
governing is assured in an almost state-like sense. The loss of national autonomy
in this procedure is substituted by participatory channels which offer the option
of “voice” in a highly integrated structure. And there is also a kind of “emergency
route“ in case enough Member States should agree to challenge the proposed
regulatory decision – which would push the CP into a joint decision-making
framework re-opening the procedure to interadministrative/intergovernmental
negotiations.
In the MRP, the first phase mode of open coordination dominates the whole pro-
cedure due to the fact that it is in the interest of the applicants to avoid the bind-
ing arbitration that is called for in the second phase, which would oblige the na-
tional authorities to adopt a uniform European decision. Thus, in this procedure,
national autonomy can be maintained because exit options are held open. “Euro-
peanization” in the sense of the application of harmonized standards takes place
only within the group of those national authorities which is prepared to agree on
a common regulatory decision. The national authorities which choose to “exit”
from the mutual recognition path are an indicator of the non-functioning of har-
monization in this specific case and the relative ineffectiveness of European gov-
erning. But, as we have seen above, the national authorities that want to protect
their national autonomy are dependent on the pharmaceutical applicant’s choice
to avoid binding arbitration.
An explanation for these differences has to go beyond institutional opportunity
structures or the institutionally defined difficulties in overcoming institutional
hurdles – such as majority requirements – and to account for the actors’ prefer-
ences in not taking certain opportunities as well as for the factors which might ac-
count for specific behavioral preferences. One important differentiator seems to
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be the type of pharmaceutical product at stake, which is related to the specific
interest structures of applying companies, national governments and also more
widely defined actors in health care systems.
The Centralized Procedure is reserved for the most innovative pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. They are the ones with little or no legacy concerning preceding regulatory
assessments and decisions. Differences in national cognitive perception, if they oc-
cur, are therefore likely to be resolved through professional deliberations, and
European assessments and evaluations, once established, are less likely to be
challenged by an institutionally necessary quorum of national authorities. Be-
cause of these products’ novelty, the chances are also lower that marketing
authorization will be influenced by considerations relating to national health-care
delivery regulations. If such considerations do come into play, discussions even
in scientifically based committees risk developing into interest-related negotia-
tions.
Turning to the interests of actors directly involved or indirectly concerned, the ar-
gument can also be made that they are generally very much in favor of an exten-
sive Europeanization of marketing authorization with respect to this category of
pharmaceuticals. Applicant companies overwhelmingly belong to the research-
intensive, internationally oriented large companies. Their aim is to get their
products as fast as possible onto the largest possible market via a single, cost-
saving procedure. In general, they are the direct beneficiaries of the Centralized
Procedure. National governments as well, at least those representing countries with
a considerable pharmaceutical industry, regard companies which are researching
and producing these innovative pharmaceuticals as a necessary industrial and
technological basis for future growth. They have an industrial-policy interest in
presenting the EC as an attractive site for research and industrial investment in
competition mainly with the USA and Japan. National governments share this
interest with the European Commission. And a well-functioning European CP is re-
garded as the competitive regulatory answer to a situation large companies en-
counter in the USA: a single procedure providing access to a large medicinal
market. There is also a kind of background interest and potential pressure for a
Europe-wide, efficient way to provide access to the most advanced medicines.
Since medical knowledge is a public good and communicated quickly in the
medical community, national boundaries are regarded as anachronistic when it
comes to medicines required for the most advanced therapies. Health care provid-
ers and their patients, very often in coalition with the concerned industry, represent
another more or less visible and more or less organized interest demanding ac-
cess, which cannot be ignored by governments and national regulatory authorities.
Beside these more product and industry-oriented interests, another interest
should be mentioned which concerns the functioning of this procedure as such. It
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is mainly the European Commission, the regulatory authority, EMEA, and its sci-
entific committee, the CPMP, but also most of the national authorities participat-
ing in this procedure that have a high motivation as regulators to prove that this
European regulatory procedure can work. When mentioning this facilitating fac-
tor for successful Europeanization, one is also reminded again of the type of
companies mainly involved in the CP. They are the ones not only with a high in-
terest in this procedure but also with the resources and the capacity to adapt to
and to be successful in a more demanding transnational regulatory environment.
The world of the Mutual Recognition Procedure is a different one. Unlike the
more international pharmaceuticals of the CP which transcend national medical,
pharmaceutical and regulatory traditions, the pharmaceuticals of the MRP are
generally the less innovative products which are embedded in an existing na-
tional medical and regulatory tradition. On the cognitive level it is much more dif-
ficult to find cross-national consensus in assessments and evaluations, and the
impact of national health care regulations can be felt as well. Therefore it is not
surprising when one national regulatory agency challenges the assessment of the
other. That this does not occur more often has to do with the fact that applying
companies can select their target countries in this still nationally based procedure.
Turning to the underlying interest structure supporting this regulatory procedure,
one can say that it is in the interest of important actor groups – largely the same
as above – to preserve this procedural alternative also. These less innovative
products are most often produced by medium-sized and smaller pharmaceutical com-
panies, which are not very strong in research, whose resources are very limited –
including those devoted to regulatory affairs – and who tend to be present only in
a few national markets. For regulatory success, the proximity of and the ac-
quaintance with their national regulatory authorities and environments are in-
strumental. A procedure like the CP is not only unnecessary and too costly for
them, it can also be too demanding in the implementation of the requirements
and too far removed from the specific “needs” of a national medicinal market.
National authorities have a specific interest in this procedure since they are still the
main regulatory actors involved, safeguarding their autonomy. From an indus-
trial policy standpoint, national governments have an interest to protect this kind of
industry, too, which might not be an especially innovative one,39 but which em-
ploys a considerable workforce and which, additionally, provides categories of
medicinal products demanded by a considerable proportion of national medical
health care providers and patients, whose therapeutic needs rely on their availability.
                                                  
39 There are, of course, many very innovative small and medium-sized companies, es-
pecially in the biotech field. Their interests are similar to those of the large, interna-
tionalized pharmaceutical companies whose cooperation or even guidance they gen-
erally need or employ in order to enhance regulatory and marketing opportunities.
Feick: Marketing Authorization for Pharmaceuticals 35
Taking especially the interests of the applying companies and the national regu-
latory authorities into account, it is perfectly understandable that the MRP rarely
arrives at the stage of binding European arbitration. A company faced with the
deviating opinion of one national authority will hesitate to force this authority
into arbitration because this might impinge on an otherwise favorable national
regulatory climate between regulator and regulatee. And, as mentioned above,
economic rationality will also prefer immediate dealing in some markets rather
than waiting until an arbitration procedure has responded to the reservations of a
deviating regulatory authority, which might even be the gatekeeper to only a
small additional market.
Given the institutional opportunity structure, which does not necessarily lead to
binding arbitration, and given the interest structure as described above, it is obvi-
ous that the MRP has little chance to succeed as a truly Europeanized procedure
and that in case of doubt – as weak as this doubt might be substantially – the
autonomy of national regulatory authorities will prevail.
5 Efficacy and Efficiency of European Regulation
This chapter is devoted to the substantive outcomes of the two European proce-
dures. The question is whether or not they contribute to the official goals of
European market entry regulation: public health protection, the establishment of
an internal market, and the fostering of an innovative and competitive European
pharmaceutical industry. In this preliminary evaluation we are interested mainly
in the relative impact of the two marketing authorization procedures.
5.1 Improvement of Public Health Protection?
The question whether and how much the European procedures – especially the
CP – might have contributed to the protection of public health is practically un-
answerable with any degree of precision. Therefore, very limited observations,
appraisals and an indirect assessment of the impact of institutional provisions
and behavioral orientations must suffice.
There are essentially two perspectives from which this question can be ap-
proached. They relate directly to the marketing authorization criteria and the in-
herent trade-off: on the one hand, the protection given against unsafe medicines,
on the other, the provision of access to efficacious medicinal products.
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The safety perspective has always been in the forefront of discussions whenever
regulations have been intensified in the aftermath of drug disasters. This per-
spective might be regarded as the politically more pertinent one since it corre-
sponds with the preference of incumbent politicians or administration heads to
avoid or to channel blame. The delegation of market entry regulation to function-
ally specialized administrations can be regarded not only as an attempt to assure
“correct” or well-informed regulatory decisions (Gehring 2000) but also to dele-
gate blame in the event of trouble (Hood 2002). This risk-averse attitude of politi-
cians and of the responsible administrators may lead to the dominance of a “pre-
cautionary principle” (Majone 2002), which might produce adverse effects by its
own logic. This points to the second perspective which maintains that specific
regulations and their implementation might hinder the development and/or
marketing of potentially beneficial pharmaceuticals either by being too cautious
on the safety side or too demanding on the efficacy side.40
The observation that no pharmaceutical disasters comparable to the thalidomide
affair have surfaced in the meantime has been taken by some observers as an in-
dication that European regulation is at least as protective against safety risks as
existing national ones have been.41 But, in general, systematic information is
missing which might help to evaluate the quality of regulatory decisions taken,
by systematically observing the utilization and impact of a pharmaceutical prod-
uct after obtaining marketing permission. Preliminary work at EMEA does not go
beyond comparative benchmarking of the decisions in the European Centralized
Procedure with those of the US-American FDA, mainly comparing substantive
decision outputs and procedural efficiency (EMEA 2000: 21). This does not tell us
anything about the quality of regulatory decisions. The Center for Medicines Re-
search International has initiated joint efforts between industry and regulators to
develop a concept and indicators for reviewing the quality of regulatory proce-
dures and decisions with the aim of fostering so-called “Good Review Practice”
(Hynes/McAulane/Walker 2001; Hynes 2000; Smith 2001a, 2001b.) These efforts
seem to concentrate more on internal procedural improvements – such as the ap-
propriateness of the applicant‘s technical document accompanying an application
or the agency’s review process – and the reduction of regulatory costs, and less
on the improvement of regulatory decisions in a comprehensive public health
perspective.
                                                  
40 A large amount of research initiated in the USA after the introduction of stricter
authorization criteria in the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act in 1962 is representative of this perspective; overviews of this evalua-
tory literature are provided for example by Scherer (2000: 1308–1316), Andersson
(1992) and Schifrin/Tayan (1977).
41 This would be the conclusion based on David Vogel’s analysis (Vogel 1998).
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Turning to qualitative evaluations by participating actors, views are split over
whether the Europeanization of the procedures has contributed to a leveling-down
or leveling-up of safety and efficacy standards. Generally speaking, representa-
tives from industry and also European regulators tend to be convinced that the
CPMP assessments are of the highest quality and that the CP is more demanding
than the average national procedure (Vos/Hagemeister 2000: 23; Abraham/
Lewis 1999: 1657, 1660; DG Enterprise 2000a: 106).42 Such views mainly have
requirements concerning the proof of efficacy in mind. With respect to safety
criteria, the views of national regulators in particular seem to be split. Some
believe that safety protection might have suffered, partly because of increased
competition for clients in the European regulatory context, especially in the MRP
(Abraham/Lewis 1999: 1661, 1662). It is feared that safety may be sacrificed for
the sake of Europeanization if products are pushed through the Mutual
Recognition Procedure with too much speed or pressure to compromise. There is
similar skepticism regarding proposals by the pharmaceutical industry to reduce
the review time for the application “dossier” from 210 to 150 days (Schweim 2001:
14). All these views are not representative, and they do not adopt a
comprehensive view on the impact on public health.
A look at the institutional framework of the European procedures and the ad-
ministrative orientations might provide some additional – though still inconclu-
sive – hints. The multiple input requirements and mutual checks embodied in the
European procedures, most pronounced in the Centralized Procedure, seem to
provide filters against extreme deviations from the expected quality of assess-
ments. Mutual checks seem to lead to a stricter application of standards (Abra-
ham/Lewis 1999: 1657–58).43
On the other hand, there are criticisms which maintain that the European regu-
latory authority is oriented and the procedure organized in a way which is sup-
posed to reduce the regulatory costs to industry. Abraham and Lewis argue that
such a ”neo-liberal” supply-side approach, reinforced through close relationships
between regulators and regulatees, informal interactions and a generally high de-
                                                  
42 In a discussion at EFPIA Info Day in 1998 an industry representative complained that
CPMP requirements in the Centralised Procedure seem to have become more severe
than they had been in the two years before (EFPIA/EMEA 1998: 40). This was read-
ily acknowledged by the then head of CPMP, Prof. Alexandre, who stated that, with
respect to the efficacy or therapeutic benefit criteria, CPMP was stricter than the US-
American FDA (ibid. and Alexandre 1998: 11).
43 There is indirect evidence that the quality of assessments was an issue in the CP early
on. The standard contract between EMEA and the “rapporteurs” for the scientific as-
sessment of applications has been revised, containing a clause now which allows
EMEA to hold back or cancel payments if the CPMP judges a report as not meeting
expected quality standards (Griffin 1997: 8).
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gree of secrecy in regulatory decision-making, would tend towards a softer, in-
dustry-friendly implementation of standards (Lewis/Abraham 2001; Abraham/
Lewis 2000: 162–172). This seems to be congruent with the regulatory orientation
expressed by the former head of the responsible DG unit of the Commission and
subsequent founding director of EMEA, who claimed that “for reasons of public
health concerns over safety, the pharmaceutical sector has traditionally been
overregulated” (Sauer 1997: 3). This regulatory orientation has its administrative
complement in attempts to create a “new public administration” which is sup-
posed to act as a professional and flexible service provider and to abandon the
traditional bureaucratic control perspective (Abraham/Lewis 2000; Feick 2000:
244–246).
The possible impact of these institutional provisions and behavioral predispositions
can be interpreted differently. Supporters of a strict control perspective anticipate
potential dangers to patients and public health. Those who endorse the facilitat-
ing regulatory perspective welcome client-orientation as a prerequisite for
speedier regulatory review processes from which both industry and patients
should benefit.
Again, these observations cannot contribute anything to a more comprehensive
assessment of the public health impact, which would have to take a more long-
term and closer view. However, specific patient groups maintain that their health
problems are barely accounted for or even ignored in the existing regulatory
market entry regimes. There are comparatively small groups of patients with dis-
eases that are so rare that they cannot be an attractive market for developing,
producing and marketing the necessary medicines (orphan drugs). There are pa-
tients suffering from life-threatening diseases for whom drugs might have been
developed in the meantime which are still in the time-consuming testing phases
required for marketing authorization. And there are the children below 16 who
are particularly undersupplied, partly due to orphan-drug problems and partly
due to the fact that it has been legally impossible or too risky, ethically problem-
atic or too costly for industry to test most of the drugs on children before pro-
ceeding to marketing authorization (DG Enterprise 2002: 2). While these are cer-
tainly public health problems, they are not a unique problem of the European
procedures, but rather one of national regimes as well, and their resolution at
times goes beyond the regulatory scope of marketing authorization.
5.2 The Single Market Goal
The abolishment of existing technical trade barriers and the prevention of new
ones within the EC has been the overarching objective of regulatory harmoniza-
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tion, cooperative and coordinative measures concerning national marketing
authorizations, and the limited Europeanization of regulatory decision-making.
As a result of this development, a convergence of the spectrum of available medi-
cines across EC countries might be expected, although market entry regulation is
not the only factor determining the size and composition of medicine supply.44
Below we will try to find empirical evidence for this expectation and to analyze
the potential of the present regulatory situation to enhance such a development.
Converging Volume of Pharmaceutical Products?
Although comparable market data are difficult to obtain,45 it seems fair to say
that the number of authorized medicinal products on the national markets has
been sharply reduced in high-volume countries like Germany, Great Britain and
France since the introduction of the more stringently harmonized regulations of
the 1960s and 1970s, especially since these new legal requirements have been ap-
plied to pharmaceutical specialties which were already on the market and had
been registered under “softer” legal provisions. Given a wider definition of mar-
keted medicines – say, all specialties (i.e. all trade names counted) – the estimated
figures for Germany and Great Britain were as high as 15,000 in the late 1970s, for
France around 7,800 (Dukes/Lunde 1979). In 2001 the comparable figures for
Britain and France were around 6,700 and 2,100 respectively. For Germany, com-
parable figures are lacking but, counting active substances only, there was an ap-
proximate reduction from 2,550 in 1981 to 1,880 in 2001. As the average number
of trade names per active substance should not be lower than for France (approx.
2:1) and probably closer to that of Britain (approx. 6:1), the 2001 figure of avail-
able specialties (trade names) for Germany might range somewhere between
4,000 and 11,000.46 The opposite trend can be observed in traditional low-volume
countries like Sweden. Here, the number increased from 750 in 1981 to 1,027 in
2001. In short, there has been a convergence of the number of medicines nation-
ally available since the introduction of stricter control measures, their harmoni-
zation and Europeanization, but differences remain high – mainly due to national
therapeutic and regulatory traditions (Dukes 1985).
                                                  
44 The attractiveness of a specific market depends on many factors, including the size
and structure of the population, the prevalence of specific medical indications and
prescribing traditions, and also regulatory conditions such as price, reimbursement
or prescribing regulations.
45 Quite a lot of data on volumes has been published in the past, but few are compara-
ble due to changing or unclear definitions and categorizations.
46 See G. Dukes (1985) and, also, the EURO-Medicines Database: www.euro-
medicines.org/index2.html (date of consultation: 23 November 2001); the figure for
Germany should drop again considerably once the so-called validation process
(“Nachzulassung”) for medicines registered before 1978 is terminated.
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A More Homogeneous European Pharmaceuticals Market?
The Europeanization of regulation could be expected to contribute to the homog-
enization of supply across Member States approaching an accessible Single Mar-
ket for doctors and patients. Longitudinal data are not available, which leaves us
with the challenge to project future developments from the status quo. Pair-wise
country comparisons of nationally available medicines show that a single market
does not yet exist, when measured in terms of equal access to medicines in all
European countries. The mutual overlap of available stocks is generally far below
100% (see Table 4). This is hardly surprising, taking differences in national pharma-
ceutical and medical traditions as well as different regulatory environments beyond
marketing authorization into account (McKee/Mossialos/Belcher 1996: 278).
Starting from this situation one can ask whether and how existing European mar-
keting authorization regulations might induce change. Two tendencies are cur-
rently leading in opposite directions. The Centralized Procedure clearly contrib-
utes to the development of a more uniform supply because centrally authorized
medicines have market access in all EU Member States. Yet, this homogenization
effect is limited to the most innovative medicinal products for which the CP is
obligatory or optional, and the number of CPs is rather small compared to that of
the MRPs (see Table 5). The homogenizing impact of the Centralized Procedure
would be reinforced if envisaged reform measures are adopted in 2003. They
Table 4   Diversity in the European Medicines Market: Mutual Availability of Active Ingredients
(country 1  country 2, in %)
Country 2
Country 1
AUT BEL DNK FRAa GER NED SWE GBR
AUT – 59 49 43 81 57 48 54
BEL 72 – 55 52 79 66 52 60
DNK 81 73 – 60 84 76 73 71
FRAa 71 69 58 – 75 68 58 63
GER 68 54 43 42 – 50 42 49
NDL 80 76 65 56 84 – 61 69
SWE 79 71 74 59 83 72 – 70
GBR 68 62 55 60 73 62 53 –
Selected countries; active ingredients categorized according to ATC code (anatomical, therapeutic, chemical).
a EURO-Medicines Database, http://www.euromedicines.org/index2.html (date of consultation: 23 November
2001).
Source: Folino-Gallo et al. (2001).
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would open up this procedure to a wider spectrum of pharmaceuticals and
would oblige pharmaceutical firms to market authorized products across Europe
within a certain period.47
The probable future impact of the Mutual Recognition Procedure is not as clear-
cut. It is a European procedure leading to similar marketing authorizations in at
least more than one Member State, and the more countries are involved and the
larger the markets covered by these countries, the more substantial the contribu-
tion of this procedure to market homogenization will be. On the other hand, the
MRP might even increase cross-national market diversity to the extent that appli-
cations may be country-selective. As was discussed earlier, this is already hap-
pening. From 1998 to 2001, an average of between 8.69 and 6.53 Member States
were involved in the MRPs.48 Taking into account that in every procedure an ap-
plication has been withdrawn from at least one Member State (see above, Table
2), then the number of Member States included in MRPs would on average be less
than half of the 15 EU countries.
The third procedural alternative, the purely National Procedure, obviously con-
tributes to cross-country diversity. In this respect, it is interesting to note that for
                                                  
47 See Commission of the European Communities (2001); for a short summary of earlier
almost identical Commission proposals, see Koenig/Engelmann/Wunsch (2001),
and for evaluatory comments, see Koenig/Müller (2000). Today, companies may still
decide not to market an authorized medicine.
48 Own computations on the basis of MRFG Reports; see http:/ /heads.medagencies.org.
Table 5   New Applications in the Centralized and Mutual Recognition Procedures
(number of applications submitted)
 CP MRP
1995 36 30
1996 35 141
1997 60 190
1998 45 183
1999 51 275
2000 54 373
2001 58 484
1995–2001 339 1,676
CP: Applications by medicinal product; pharmaceuticals categories A and B. 
MRP: Applications are procedures irrespective of number of countries involved.
Sources: EMEA General Reports 1996–2001 (always most recent and revised data).
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example in Germany national authorizations by far outweigh European ones.49
The opposite seems to be true for Portugal and Spain, Member States with con-
siderably smaller markets.50
Considering that only a small fraction of applications in the European Union are
covered by the CP, that MRPs almost never include all Member States and that
national applications in just one Member State also maintain diversity, it seems
evident that the diversity between national markets should prevail at least for
some time. This projection requires some qualifications and further interpreta-
tions. If in the future, due to the ongoing legislative revision, more innovative
medicinal products will have to be processed obligatorily in the CP, and if the CP
may be chosen for a much wider spectrum of medicines voluntarily – as pro-
posed by the European Commission – then the CP will increasingly contribute to
the creation of a homogenized European product market for a much wider array
of medicinal products than it does today. But what might become even more im-
portant in this respect is a possible change in pharmaceuticals distribution. The
key words here are mail-order business and e-commerce – distribution channels
which are beginning to take hold for cost-containment reasons even in countries
where they are presently prohibited. Thus Internet pharmacies and distribution
by mail could become a means which would render other regulatory barriers ob-
solete.
5.3 Procedural Efficiency: Approval Times
One of the objectives of procedural Europeanization was to increase regulatory
efficiency and thus reduce regulatory costs to industry. One important compo-
nent of these costs is the time regulatory authorities need for the review and ap-
proval of applications. In the past, approval times had often been a matter of dis-
pute in those countries in which companies lost months or even years of sales due
to slow review processes. It was the aim of the Centralized Procedure in particu-
lar to cut approval times and thus contribute to achieving the EU’s goals not only
in health policy but in industrial policy as well.
                                                  
49 German figures for 2001 (data for other years or other agencies not yet being avail-
able) show that roughly 71% of all finalized authorizations in 2001 (the total includ-
ing those stemming from MRPs or CPs and excluding parallel import permits and
also the registration of homeopathic and anthroposophical medicines) have been
purely national ones (own computations on the basis of BfArM and EMEA data).
50 Interview D–2002–1a.
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Convergence Trends before 1995
In the years before the new European procedures became operational, approval
times had already tended to converge. From the EU countries reviewed, only
Italy deviates from this trend (see Figure 3, which includes data for the USA as a
comparative reference). Although national approval times can vary considerably
from compound to compound and from country to country for the same com-
pound, the general tendency seems obvious. In 1995 there were still big differ-
ences between national authorities, but they were far smaller than those that ex-
isted at the beginning of the 1990s.
These findings can be interpreted as the effect of an emerging competition among
regulatory agencies.51 Germany had to catch up in terms of procedural efficiency
                                                  
51 Analyses show that even the weak procedural attempts at Europeanization before
1995 (multi-state and concertation procedures) must have had some impact. Ap-
proval times were shorter when national authorities participated in such a “Euro-
pean” procedure compared to a purely national one. For France and Great Britain
these differences were small – both countries already starting from a low time level
in the national procedures – while, for Germany, they were considerable, the purely
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and, to achieve this, had invested more resources in the Europeanized ap-
proaches than in the purely national procedures. The British agency traditionally
had comparably short approval times and cultivated this tradition and image
through public management reforms and marketing efforts. The situation of the
French authority was, again, different. Having had extremely short approval
times in the past,52 the increase in average approval time in France between 1990
and 1995 can be interpreted as an attempt to gain regulatory credibility (Thomas
1996: 116). France prepared itself extremely carefully for the new European “era”
when creating a new agency in 1993. It is also the only agency which has set up a
small office in London.
The New European Procedures
Comparing the two new European procedures, median approval time for the Cen-
tralized Procedure has stabilized around 1.2 years (Figure 4), while corresponding
figures for the Mutual Recognition Procedure are four to five months longer for
the two years the MRP has been fully operational53 (CMR international 2001: 1).
Not surprisingly, approval times for the MRP, which is still a nationally based pro-
cedure, are closer to the figures for the National Procedures in 1995 (see Figure 4).
The differences in efficiency (approval time) between the two procedures – al-
most five months on average – cannot be fully explained by legal deadlines,
which account for roughly one month. What seems to be more important are the
modes of monitoring and control established by the different institutional frame-
works, on the one hand, and both product and applicant-related factors, on the
other. These are mainly the same factors discussed above in relation to the gen-
eral functioning of the two procedures (see Section 4).
For the Centralized Procedure a rather well-organized and well-equipped coor-
dinating and monitoring organization (EMEA) does exist, which is accountable to
a supervisory board composed of members from national authorities and EU in-
stitutions and, what is more, whose executive and scientific heads have been
                                                                                                                                                 
national procedures taking roughly 70% longer than those which required inter-
agency communication and cooperation in the multi-state and concertation proce-
dures (Thomas et al. 1998: 795).
52 Nevertheless, industry did criticize the French regulators: In their view, marketing
authorization was speedily granted, but the regulation of prices and reimbursement
was much too slow.
53 In this comparison, approval times in the MRP have been counted from the date of
application until the end of the 90-day discussion phase between the RMS and the
CMSs (Shapiro 2001), after which time the individual CMSs decide whether to grant
mutual recognition or not.
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highly motivated by their own professional biography to make the new organi-
zation and especially the CP work. Such an institutional support does not exist
for the Mutual Recognition Procedure. Organizational aid by EMEA has been
minimal, and efforts to coordinate and monitor this procedure have to come vol-
untarily from the national authorities.
Depending on the procedure, regulatory competition is organized differently among
national authorities. In the CP, national agencies are in competition with each
other within the regulatory procedure by way of collective discussion and deci-
sion processes. National authorities’ representatives chosen as rapporteurs or co-
rapporteurs are under close observation by their peers, including face-to-face dis-
cussions. In the MRP, regulatory competition takes place mainly before the Euro-
pean procedure. National authorities compete for clients – or, more accurately,
fees – to become Reference Member States. After this choice has been made by the
applying companies, the Concerned Member States do not have a special incen-
tive to assure procedural efficiency. In an environment of inter-agency regulatory
competition they might even try to show that the national authority chosen has
worked quickly but not well enough to assure mutual recognition.
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Other factors such as the type of pharmaceutical product to be processed and the type
of applicant (firm) seeking marketing authorization are important, too. The CP is
reserved for the very advanced or comparatively innovative medicinal products,
which tend to be the most important ones, both economically and therapeutically,
and are generally linked to the most powerful pharmaceutical companies. Pres-
sures from industry, governments and even concerned professional and patient
groups can be expected to be high if the Centralized Procedure – the only one
available for Part A pharmaceuticals – does not meet efficiency expectations.
Furthermore, companies producing especially innovative medicines and oriented
towards international markets are also fairly competent in regulatory affairs.
Their applications provide fewer causes for subsequent questions. These favor-
able conditions for rather smooth and time-efficient regulatory reviews cannot be
expected to the same degree in the MRP.
In the USA, median approval time has been substantially reduced since 1995 (Fig-
ure 4), putting additional pressure on the EC to streamline its procedures further.
Thus, one of the aims of the present legislative review is to cut both the time
EMEA needs to produce its opinion upon receiving the CPMP’s recommendation,
and the time the Commission needs to produce the regulatory decision draft once
it has received EMEA’s opinion.54 Yet not only the review and decision-making
time in the European institutions and committees are important for companies
eager to get their product on the market. Also the so-called stopclock time which
companies need to respond to questions regulators feel obliged to pose after an
application has been submitted has to be added to the time budget. The average
response time to questions of the CPMP in the CP increased from 119 days in
1996 to 179 in 2000. This is an important part of the overall approval time55 – in
2000 roughly 38% (Humphreys 2001).
The legislative amendment proposals (Commission of the European Communi-
ties 2001) try to reduce time consumption at both ends. Shorter deadlines, an in-
creased and more systematic involvement of outside experts, and the new comi-
tology procedure are supposed to further streamline the internal regulatory proc-
ess. On the other hand, pre-filing interactions between regulators and regulatees
are to be encouraged and reinforced, allowing the latter to adapt more easily to
regulatory review requirements early on in the pharmaceutical development pro-
cess and obliging the former not only to provide more guidance for the regulatees
but also to introduce some kind of self-binding mechanism for regulators in view
                                                  
54 Much of this time consumption has been due to the old – by now reformed – comi-
tology procedure and also to the extensive translation requirements.
55 It is difficult to explain this development. Maybe the CPMP became more demanding
and the companies less careful, or maybe less experienced companies were using the
Centralized Procedure, especially as an optional route for Part B pharmaceuticals.
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of the envisaged application. This externally oriented measure has been inspired
by FDA practice in the USA and is in line with the new concept of public admini-
stration as a client-oriented service organization.
6 Conclusions and Outlook
The Europeanization of regulatory decision-making in the sub-field of pharma-
ceutical marketing authorization seems to resemble – at least in hindsight – a
quasi-logical path of integrationism leading towards a European “domestic re-
gime” (Hooghe/Marks 2001: 39), (Marks 1997: 28). Governing takes place at the
European level (Grande 2000: 11), but this “governing in Europe” (Scharpf 1999)
is a multi-faceted enterprise. Three different regulatory regimes for the same sub-
stantive problem or intervention task are available within the EC. This “patch-
work” of policy solutions (Héritier 1996) in a single regulatory subsector is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that each European procedural regime contains dif-
ferent modes of Europeanization signifying distinctive degrees of invasiveness of
European governing vis-à-vis national authorities. Despite “regulatory maximal-
ism” (Scharpf 1996: 239) concerning the harmonization of product standards, only
one of the three regulatory procedures represents “procedural maximalism”: the
Centralized Procedure provides for an integrated, genuinely European regulatory
decision-making process which – despite considerable national participation and
additional safeguards – represents the most invasive mode of Europeanization,
namely hierarchical or central direction. At first sight, such a result seems meager
after more than thirty years of policy development, considering that large parts of
regulatory assessment and evaluation in this domain are shaped by scientifically
and technically oriented deliberations, and also taking into account that the set-
ting and implementing of common product standards are regarded as one of the
easier and less conflictive integration exercises (Scharpf 1999: 107). The differen-
tiation into three regulatory procedures obviously responds to the needs and in-
terests not only of a pharmaceutical industry which is heterogeneous with respect
to capacity, product range and market coverage but also of national regulatory
authorities eager to maintain their regulatory positions and impact, and it re-
sponds to the heterogeneity of pharmacological and medical traditions.
We have analyzed the extent to which the different procedures establish effective
European governing structures and how these structures affect the balance be-
tween European centralization and the autonomy of national authorities. So far,
only the Centralized Procedure can be regarded as a regulatory regime which in-
tegrates national authorities into a collective procedure, leading to uniform and
binding European decisions. This centralized integration, which eliminates exit
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options for national authorities, is counterbalanced by ample opportunities for
them to raise their voice – be it in the central collective assessment and evaluation
phase or in the administrative phase of regulatory decision-making. While the
first phase follows the mode of central direction, the second resembles a situation
of joint decision-making. Even so, the centralization perspective prevails due to
strict legislative stipulations, the functional weight of the central Agency’s as-
sessment and the determination of most of the participating actors to make this
procedure – reserved for the most innovative and most internationalized medici-
nal products – succeed. The ongoing legislative review process orchestrated by
the European Commission will most probably increase the importance of the CP
for the European pharmaceuticals market. Such a development would be in
keeping with von Beyme’s expectation that whenever consumer protection and
industrial policy competences are entrusted to the European level – market entry
regulation for pharmaceuticals affecting both – they are bound to become more
extensive (Klaus von Beyme 1995 in: Weidenfeld 1995: 110).
The Mutual Recognition Procedure, which was designed to be a European re-
gime, is still a nationally based procedure with national regulatory decisions – not
only, or not necessarily, because it applies to a varying subset of Member States to
whose authorities applications are addressed but, mainly, because decision-
making generally remains national and very rarely arrives at the genuinely Euro-
pean stage. The first phase of this procedure very much resembles a mutual ad-
justment process in which attempts are made to adjust national assessments,
evaluations and decisions to what might be regarded as correct regulatory deci-
sions on the basis of an intensively harmonized legislation. But, in fact, this pro-
cedure tends to protect the autonomy of national regulatory decision-making and
to work against uniform European solutions because national authorities behave
according to national orientations and because the procedure rarely reaches the
second phase of binding central arbitration (because firms withdraw applications
from dissenting Member States for economic reasons). The ongoing legislative re-
view might bring about changes which will facilitate consensus-building among
national authorities involved in an MRP. However, it is unlikely that the really
Europeanizing step of obligatory arbitration in the event of deviating national
opinions will be taken.
It would be premature to regard the incremental development of different forms
of regulatory decision-making as a process which should necessarily lead to a
completely centralized system at the European level. Important actors would op-
pose attempts to marginalize the national authorities in a principal-agent rela-
tionship vis-à-vis the European Commission and its agency, EMEA, or even
abandon the national structures to a large extent. Industry might be more inter-
ested in the efficiency of the existing procedures than their convergence into one
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supranational regime which would eliminate the option of procedural choice.
Leaving a high degree of regulatory impact or even autonomy to the national
authorities and considerable flexibility of procedural choice to industry, the MRP
is a complement to the “real” European procedure, the Centralized Procedure,
and not – at least not yet – a second genuinely European regulatory path. But
there are quite a number of national regulators and other observers who expect
there to be a developmental logic of incremental responses to preceding deficien-
cies, with quantum leaps every once in a while. This might eventually lead to a
completely centralized marketing authorization system, which will only function
and institutionalize itself if it has substantial financial and administrative re-
sources and if it incorporates the market-oriented flexibility characteristic of the
current multiple-procedure set-up.
Our second concern has been the substantive impact the existing regulatory al-
ternatives might have on the attainment of the three official regulatory goals:
public health protection assuring safe and efficacious medicines, the creation of a
Single Market and the reduction of regulatory costs to industry.
Despite discussions about probable biases towards industry-friendly implemen-
tation there are as yet no indications that the European procedures are introduc-
ing substantially less safe or efficacious medicinal products than the purely na-
tional procedures have done to date. Until now, the concerned countries have
been spared another pharmaceutical and medical catastrophe like the thalido-
mide affair.56 But from a comprehensive public health perspective, the European
procedures face the well-known double criticism that regulations tend to be too
applicant-friendly (i.e. industry-friendly) when interpreting allowable safety risks
and required efficacy levels, on the one hand, and that there is a bias towards risk
aversion, on the other, which might prevent innovative medicines from being de-
veloped, from entering the market fast enough or even being marketed at all.
Evaluations are lacking which would allow for a more thorough assessment of
the quality of regulatory procedures and outcomes in a comprehensive and long-
term perspective.
Contributions to the creation of a Single Market for pharmaceuticals are provided
unequivocally only by the Centralized Procedure. These contributions are – at
least quantitatively – outbalanced by the MRP and the National Procedures. This
imbalance might swing in the other direction in the future as a result of institu-
tional reforms which would enlarge the scope of the Centralized Procedure. But,
                                                  
56 One should, of course, mention the catastrophe of HIV-infected blood for transfu-
sions in the 1980s and early 1990s. But, in most countries, this occurred in regulatory
and institutional frameworks different from those in which medicinal products are
controlled before market entry.
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on the whole, cross-national diversity will probably remain in the EC market. In
the interest of protecting their national authorities, their small and medium-sized
national pharmaceutical companies relying on regional markets, their national
pharmaceutical and medical traditions and, finally, their national health care
regulations in a wider sense, Member States might not be inclined to give up their
remaining national regulatory autonomy in the foreseeable future.
From an industrial policy perspective, regulatory efficiency and cost reduction
measured in terms of approval times has been a permanent issue in the discus-
sion of market entry regulation. One may conclude that procedural efficiency has
improved due to Europeanization. Even before the new European regulatory
procedures came into force, the envisaged competition between national regula-
tory authorities was shortening average approval times considerably in a con-
verging move across most national authorities. Comparing the two European
procedures, it is the Centralized Procedure which has taken the lead over the De-
centralized Procedure. However, prudence is advised: such a limited efficiency
indicator risks being highly biased in favor of industry’s interests in bringing a
product as quickly and cheaply as possible onto the market. More meaningful ef-
ficiency indicators would have to evaluate costs and benefits in a more compre-
hensive way than anyone has yet attempted.
Abbreviations
CMS Concerned Member State
CP Centralized Procedure
CPMP Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products
EC European Community
EEC European Economic Community
EMEA European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products
EU European Union
FDA Food and Drug Administration
MRFG Mutual Recognition Facilitation Group
MRP Mutual Recognition Procedure
NP National Procedures
RMS Reference Member State
SPC Summary of Product Characteristics
TEC Treaty of the European Communities
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